A Critique of Donna Yarri’s Burden/Benefit Analysis for Animal Experimentation. By Dr Chapman Chen

In her 2005 book The Ethics of Animal Experimentation: A Critical Analusis and Constructive Christian Proposal, US theologian Prof. Donna Yarri claims that “dominion” in Genesis 1:26 means benign stewardship (Yarri 2005, p.116). She progressively points out that “since animal were created before humans…their purpose must be something other than… their relationship to humans.” She righteously argues that “God values, loves… all animals… that God does not care less about animals kept in cages in laboratories” (Yarri 2005, p.112-3), that “animals have intrinsic value in the sight of God”, that animals have mental states and sentience (Yarri 2005, p. 135, 153), that animals “ultimately exist for the glory of God,” and thus should not be viewed primarily in terms of their instrumental value to humans as in experimentation (Yarri 2005, pp. 113).

1. A Burden/Benefit Analysis Model

It is on this theological basis that Yarri proposes a burden/benefit analysis model for animal experimentation, in which she weighs definite burdens on animals against possible benefits to humans. Thus, very grave benefits—such as major advances against fatal diseases—may justify minimal or moderate burdens; serious benefits may likewise justify minimal or moderate burdens; moderate benefits justify only minimal burdens; and minimal benefits justify no burden at all. Importantly, serious and very grave burdens can never be justified, irrespective of the anticipated human benefit.

2. The Biggest Theological Flaw

The biggest theological flaw of Yarri’s burden/benefit analysis is that she thinks that “dominion” means human surrogate lordship, though he adds that it should be a benevolent one because God is loving and compassionate (Yarri 2005, p.116). “Dominion suggests that God’s rulership in the world is largely exercised through the power, decisions, and actions of human beings,” she claims (Yarri 2005, p.114). On this basis, she concludes that “to have dominion can allow for the use of animals in experiments” (Yarri 2005, p.116).

3. Dominion as Servanthood Instead of Human Surrogate Lordship

By contrast, I think dominion in Genesis 1:26 and 1:28 should be understood not as human authority over animals but as servanthood, in the compassionate spirit of Jesus Christ. The ancient, pre-Masoretic Hebrew consonantal form of “dominion” is ירדו (yirdu), which can be read either as רָדָה (rādāh, “to subjugate”) or יָרַד (yārad, “to lower oneself”) (cf. Ehrenfeld and Bentley 1985: 301). I maintain that only yārad provides the correct interpretation, for two major reasons. First, Jesus declares that he “came to serve, not to be served” (Matt 20:28) and teaches that “anyone who wants to be first must be the very last, and the servant of all” (Mark 9:35). Second, the command to “have dominion” (Gen 1:28) is immediately followed by God’s prescription of a vegan diet for humanity (Gen 1:29) (cf. Linzey 1995: 34). On this basis, Linzey argues that “dominion” means stewardship rather than despotism, and that humanity has the unique potential to become the “servant species,” working with God for the liberation of animals (Linzey 1995, pp. 34, 45, 57).

4. Ethical Problems

Ethically, Donna Yarri’s burden/benefit analysis remains fundamentally problematic because it presupposes that prospective benefits to humans can, at least in principle, justify deliberately imposing harms on non-consenting animals. (Such a calculation also depends upon uncertain assumptions concerning the scientific relevance and predictive value of animal experiments and whether comparable benefits could be obtained by non-animal methods.) The asymmetry is crucial: the anticipated benefits are prospective and often uncertain, whereas the animals’ confinement, fear, pain, injury, deprivation, and death are immediate and real.

4.1. A Heart-Transplant Experiment on Pigs

For example, Yarri proposes a hypothetical burden/benefit case: if a heart-transplant experiment produced potentially very great benefits for humans, and if the pigs experienced only a “moderate burden” consisting of temporary discomfort followed by recovery and normal life, she thinks the very great benefit might justify that burden (Yarri 2005, pp.152-3). But this is precisely where the example becomes problematic. A heart-transplant procedure is major invasive surgery, not something naturally described as merely causing “short-term discomfort.” It entails anaesthesia, major surgical trauma, postoperative pain, substantial physiological stress, risks of infection and complications, and potentially death. If the pig is the organ donor, removal of the heart is necessarily fatal. If the pig is the recipient, the animal undergoes major thoracic surgery and faces potentially serious postoperative complications.

Notice also Yarri's qualification: “if in good enough health to do so.” If there is a realistic possibility that the pigs will not be in sufficiently good health to live normal lives afterwards, the expected burden cannot straightforwardly be characterised merely as transient discomfort.

This actually illustrates a broader weakness in burden/benefit analysis: the benefit is prospective (“expected”), whereas much of the physical burden imposed upon the experimental animal is certain and immediate. In addition, describing invasive experimental procedures using categories such as “moderate burden” can make qualitatively serious interventions appear commensurable with projected benefits simply by placing both on the same conceptual scale.

5. No Informed Consent

Also, as admitted by Yarri herself, animals cannot give informed consent to being used as experimental subjects (Yarri 2005, p.153), and many animal experiments may be scientifically unnecessary or replaceable.

6. Conclusion

Yarri's position is essentially that some sufficiently beneficial animal experimentation may be permissible if burdens are adequately constrained. Our position challenges the legitimacy of the balancing operation itself: an innocent sentient creature is not ours to harm merely because somebody else may benefit.

Consequently, only genuinely non-harmful research involving animals—such as respectful observation of their natural behaviour or food preferences in their natural habitats—can be theologically and ethically justified.

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